On the Robustness of Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning by Lin, Jieyu et al.
On the Robustness of Cooperative Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning
Jieyu Lin∗, Kristina Dzeparoska∗, Sai Qian Zhang†, Alberto Leon-Garcia∗, Nicolas Papernot∗‡
∗University of Toronto
†Harvard University
‡Vector Institute
{jieyu.lin, kristina.dzeparoska}@mail.utoronto.ca
Abstract—In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning
(c-MARL), agents learn to cooperatively take actions as a team
to maximize a total team reward. We analyze the robustness of c-
MARL to adversaries capable of attacking one of the agents on a
team. Through the ability to manipulate this agent’s observations,
the adversary seeks to decrease the total team reward.
Attacking c-MARL is challenging for three reasons: first, it is
difficult to estimate team rewards or how they are impacted by an
agent mispredicting; second, models are non-differentiable; and
third, the feature space is low-dimensional. Thus, we introduce
a novel attack. The attacker first trains a policy network with
reinforcement learning to find a wrong action it should encourage
the victim agent to take. Then, the adversary uses targeted
adversarial examples to force the victim to take this action.
Our results on the StartCraft II multi-agent benchmark
demonstrate that c-MARL teams are highly vulnerable to pertur-
bations applied to one of their agent’s observations. By attacking
a single agent, our attack method has highly negative impact on
the overall team reward, reducing it from 20 to 9.4. This results
in the team’s winning rate to go down from 98.9% to 0%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Algorithms for cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement
Learning (c-MARL) are driving progress in a wide range
of applications such as traffic light control [1], autonomous
driving [2], and cellular base station control [3]. Because they
involve critical infrastructure, understanding the robustness of
c-MARL agents to adversarial manipulations of their environ-
ment is a pre-requisite to their deployment in production.
The goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL) is to optimize
the actions taken by agents in complex environments, by
learning actions that effectively maximize a long-term reward.
Techniques for c-MARL were introduced to adapt RL al-
gorithms to environments in which a team of multiple RL
agents interact. Agents that form a team collaborate towards a
common goal. c-MARL presents a number of key challenges
including non-stationary environment, and limited bandwidth
for information sharing internal to a team once training is
completed and agents are deployed [4]. Combined with partial
observability (any given agent may not always have access to
all observations made by other agents in the team), it is more
difficult for an agent in c-MARL to select the best action and
maximize the total team reward.
RL agents are known to be vulnerable to adversaries per-
turbing their observations with adversarial examples [5], as
well as adversaries directly controlling the actions of one of
the victim’s opponents [6]. When exploited, this vulnerability
results in agents taking unintended actions, often with adverse
consequences. We hypothesize that cooperative aspects of c-
MARL agents, which enable them to outperform classic RL
agents when operating as a team, also increase the vulnerabil-
ity of a team to failures of one of its constituent agents.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to
study c-MARL in adversarial settings and characterize the
attack surface exposed by enabling agents to cooperate more
effectively. Our goal is to understand the impact an adversary
can have on the long-term reward of a team of agents.
We consider an adversary who is capable of controlling the
observations of a single victim agent. The adversary mounts
their attack by presenting the victim agent with adversarial
examples. As c-MARL systems are increasingly deployed in
critical infrastructure, there is a pressing need to assess their
robustness in order to develop tailored defense mechanisms
that promote security and safety in c-MARL.
Several aspects of c-MARL preclude us from directly ap-
plying known attack algorithms for RL agents:
1) Team Reward Estimation & Non-Differentiability:
Because joint value estimation networks used to estimate
a team’s total reward are trained with the assumption
that agents will always choose the optimal action, they
do not accurately predict the team reward when some of
the agents misbehave (i.e., select non-optimal actions).
Furthermore, estimating the team reward involves non-
differentiable operations such as computing a maximum.
This makes it difficult for an attacker to estimate (and
thus decrease) the total team reward.
2) Misclassification 6= Reward: High misclassification
rates are not sufficient to lead to failure of RL. Wrong
actions taken by agents at any point in time need to
impact long-term rewards for the adversary to succeed.
3) Low-dimensional Input Feature Space: In many c-
MARL settings, agents are processing feature vectors
with lower dimensions than images; hence, this limits
the ways an adversary can perturb these observations.
To address these challenges, we propose a novel two-step
attack method (see Figure 2). The first step uses RL to train
an adversarial policy. This policy helps the adversary select
actions which, if taken by an agent, would minimize the total
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team reward. This method only requires black-box access to
the agent. The second step perturbs the agent’s observation
with an adversarial example so as to lure it to perform this
adversarial action. To accommodate for the specificities of
c-MARL, we refine existing approaches for finding targeted
adversarial examples. In particular, we address the low input
dimensionality and lack of smoothness of the optimization
objective by adaptively setting hyperparameters of the attack.
Finally, we introduce a regularization penalty to the training
objective of our adversarial policy (the first step of the attack)
to ensure that this first step produces a target adversarial action
that is more easily achievable by the second step of the attack.
This ensures that adversarial examples found can consistently
decrease the reward and team win rate simultaneously.
In our evaluation, we show that by perturbing the obser-
vation of a single agent, we can jeopardize the team almost
as effectively as an adversary directly controlling this agents
actions. This significantly reduces the total team reward of the
c-MARL system. Our results on the StartCraft II multi-agent
benchmark [7] show that an attacker able to perturb with an
average of 8.3 L1 norm (out of 96 features ranging from −1 to
1) in the victim’s input observation can successfully degrade
the systems team win rate from 98.9% to 0% (because its
reward goes down from 20 to 9.4).
Considering we were able to produce such results by
attacking a single c-MARL agent, we emphasize in Section V
the necessity for suitable defenses, robust agents, and other
protection measures against adversarial example attacks. Our
contributions are listed as follows:
• We propose a novel two-step attack for c-MARL system
that is capable of reducing the total team reward by only
perturbing the observation of a single agent.
• We regularize the training of our adversarial policy to
improve our two-step attack, demonstrating that rein-
forcement learning can be an effective adaptive strategy
in the presence of difficult optimization landscapes when
crafting adversarial examples (e.g., as is the case when
defenses perform gradient masking [8], [9]).
• We extend existing adversarial example methods to create
d-JSMA which is suitable for attacking RL model with
low-dimensional feature space.
• We demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our
attack on c-MARL in the StarCraft II multi-agent bench-
mark. Our adversary brings down the team win rate from
98.9% to 0% by perturbing a single agent’s observations.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Centralized Training Decentralized Execution and QMIX
In c-MARL, due to the partial observability and limited
communication among agents, learning decentralized policies
is required to support decentralized execution. Current state-
of-the-art MARL methods apply centralized training scheme,
where agents can exchange their local information during
training phase, and act independently during execution.
One approach for centralized training and decentralized
execution is QMIX [10] (Figure 1), a multi-agent Deep Q-
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Fig. 1: High-level architecture of the QMIX algorithm.
learning (DQN) algorithm, where each agent uses an RNN-
based DQN network to estimate the action values based on
their partial observation. DQN has recently achieved success
in a variety of RL tasks. It uses experience replay and a target
network to improve stability and convergence of RL training.
To maximize the total team reward, QMIX estimates the joint
action values through a mixing network that takes in each
agent’s selected action Q-value (i.e., action with max Q-value)
and the current state to estimate the total team reward, Qtotal.
With an accurate estimation of Qtotal, we can fine-tune the
individual agent’s Q network, so a greater total team reward
can be achieved during execution.
B. Threat Model
We model the c-MARL game as a Dec-POMDP [11] with
N agents cooperating to execute some tasks, with the goal
of maximizing their total team reward. More specifically, at
each time step t, each agent i (0 < i < N ) takes the (partial)
observation oit as input, and performs an action a
i
t with the
highest action value. Let at = {ait} be a vector of actions
taken by all the agents at time t. The goal is to find the optimal
at that maximizes the total team reward R.
Our threat model considers a single vulnerable agent iˆ
whose observation oiˆt can be modified by the adversary. We as-
sume the adversary has already predetermined this agent. This
is realistic, as in a real-world distributed system environment,
an adversary can potentially gain access to a single node, but
may not be able to affect all nodes. The adversary’s goal is to
minimize R by making a minor modification to oiˆt.
C. Attack Overview
Figure 2 shows a high-level diagram of our two-step attack.
In the first step, we use RL to learn an adversarial policy that
estimates which action, if taken by the victim, would result in
the largest decrease in the total reward R. In the second step,
we use gradient-based targeted adversarial example crafting to
perturb the victim’s observation such that it will take the action
returned by the adversarial policy in the first step. Intuitively,
using RL rather than a gradient-based strategy in the first
step circumvents any non-differentiable operation found in
how QMIX estimates the total reward R. Nevertheless, in
the second step, the attacker can still apply gradient-based
methods to craft adversarial examples—once it has identified
the target action, these adversarial examples should conduce.
Our two-step attack can be implemented in realistic threat
models. The first step only assumes black-box access: ad-
versaries query the black-box agent policy and its environ-
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Fig. 2: Two-step attack on a single agent in a c-MARL environment, as
depicted by the orange lines and boxes.
ment. The second step assumes the adversary has sufficient
access to find adversarial examples. We instantiate a gradient-
based strategy, which requires access to the victim’s model
parameters and observations. However, our attack could be
extended to the black-box setting with finite-differences [12]
or by creating a replica of the victim’s model and leveraging
the transferability property of adversarial examples.
III. ATTACK METHODS
In this section, we discuss both steps of our attack in details.
A. Learning adversarial policy
In this part of the attack, the goal is to optimize the behavior
of the victim agent so its actions will result in a decreased total
team reward R. We first explore naı¨ve ways of selecting target
actions for the victim agent:
• Random action: Randomly selecting an available action.
• Local worst action (LW): Selecting the action with the
lowest Q-value based on the output of its Q network.
• QMIX worst action: Selecting the action leading to
the min Qtotal value output by the mixing network. We
omit the max operation, and instead feed each available
action’s Q-value separately through the mixing network,
and select the action leading to the worst Qtotal.
Despite the success of the above methods in reducing R,
the victim agent’s negative effect upon the team performance
remains limited. To help improve the robustness of c-MARL, it
is important to understand the worst-case behavior of a single
agent. We propose RL-based optimization to more effectively
select an action for the victim agent. We design two variants:
• Optimized worst adversarial policy (OW): Using RL
to learn a victim agent policy that minimizes R.
• OW with regularization (OWR): Adding regularization
to OW, to be more efficiently combined with the adver-
sarial example search performed in step two of the attack.
OW: To use RL to train an adversarial policy, we first turn
to the formulation of c-MARL. Following the notations in
Section II-B, the goal is to maximize the sum of discounted
team rewards over time t:
argmax
θ1,θ2,...θN
∞∑
t=0
γtRt(st,at, st+1) (1)
where θ represents the parameters for each agents policy, γ
is the reward discount factor, st is the state, and st+1 is
determined by a transition function T in the environment. The
goal of centralized training is to maximize the total reward by
tuning the parameters of all the agents’ policy.
In an adversarial environment, we can consider the policies
of all the non-victim agents as fixed, i.e. deterministic, hence
from the victim’s perspective, they are considered as part of
the environment. Thus, we can formulate our attack as a single
agent RL problem, with the goal of minimizing R:
argmin
θ′v
∞∑
t=0
γtRt(st, a
v
t , st+1) (2)
where avt is the victim agent’s action at time step t, and θ
′v
parameterizes the victim agents policy. With Equation 2, we
can train an adversarial policy that selects actions for the
victim agent that will minimize R. In our implementation,
we use DQN to train such an adversarial policy.
OWR: Despite OW’s ability to learn an effective adversarial
policy, this may not be sufficient for the adversary to succeed.
Some of the target actions returned by the adversarial policy
in this first step may be difficult to achieve given a limited
perturbation budget when crafting an adversarial example
for the victim agent in the second step. Thus, we propose
OWR, which regularizes the objective optimized to train the
adversarial policy. The new penalty reflects how difficult it
would be to find an adversarial example for the predicted
target.
Indeed, we observe that the adversarial example search
sometimes fails to achieve a target action when the difference
between the target action Q-value and the original action Q-
value becomes too large. Intuitively, some actions are harder to
achieve than others through adversarial examples because they
are further away in the agent’s decision space. To improve the
attack success rate, we observe that the victim does not need
to perform the most optimal action at each time step, instead
it should focus on selecting the most optimal actions for the
steps that have high negative impact on the team reward.
To incorporate this idea, we modify the DQN training used
in OW to include a regularization term. The loss function of
the attacker’s Q network with regularization is defined as:
L =
B∑
b=1
T∑
t=1
[(ybtarget −Qtarget(ov,bt , av,bt ))2 + λddiff 2] (3)
where ybtarget = r
b
t + γmaxat+1Qtarget(o
v,b
t+1, a
v,b
t+1), r
b
t is the
reward for time step t, ddiff is the Q-value difference between
the target action and the original best action, λ is the weight
of the ddiff regularization, and b represents the batch index.
B. Adversarial example generation to lure victim agents
Next, the attack perturbs observations to have the victim
select the action output by the adversarial policy from Sec-
tion III-A. One could hope to apply existing gradient-based
adversarial example algorithms. However, the attack needs to
be targeted. Indeed, we find in Figure 3a that naively applying
(a) Team win rate (b) Misclassification Rate
(c) Total Reward (d) Target Action Success Rate
Fig. 3: Performance of FGSM-based methods as a function of the
perturbation budget .
the FGSM [13] results in total team rewards (28.7%) that
remain higher than what could be achieved by a random action
baseline shown in Table I (3.4%). The attack also needs to
retain sufficient flexibility to handle constraints placed on low-
dimensional inputs observed from the agent’s environment.
This would require finding a differentiable loss function that
hardcodes some of these constraints for the CW method [14]
to be applicable.
To more effectively craft adversarial examples for reduc-
ing R, we extended existing approaches to create two new
methods: Iterative target-based FGSM method (it-FGSM) and
Dynamic budget JSMA attack (d-JSMA).
it-FGSM: We adapt the i-FGSM [15] algorithm to a targeted
method by taking gradient on the target Q-value instead of the
loss, that is changing ∇XL(X) to ∇XQtarget(X).
Figure 3 shows the performance of it-FGSM compared to
FGSM. it-FGSM methods are more effective in reducing the
total team reward and team win rate. it-FGSM + LW achieves
the best performance by reducing the team reward and team
winning rate to 11.63 and 7.33%, respectively. However, we
observe the performance of it-FGSM + OW is sub-optimal due
to the lower target action success rate. Therefore, we conclude
that the FGSM-based method is still not sufficiently effective
for our problem setting.
d-JSMA: JSMA [16] is by default a targeted method, so
it is suitable for our setting. It constructs a saliency map
and perturbs the features with the highest saliency score (i.e.
features that have large positive gradients for the target class
and large negative sum of gradients for the non-target class).
In our attempt to apply JSMA to our problem, we encountered
two challenges, hence proposed d-JSMA to overcome them:
1. Two features bidirectional perturbation: In our setting,
when perturbing only a single feature, it is difficult to find
features that have a positive gradient to our target action,
but negative sum for the rest. Figure 4 shows an example
gradient of action Q-values, where the gradients of different
actions with respect to a single feature are often similar.
Hence, perturbing a feature that increases the target action’s
Q-value inadvertently causes an increase to the rest of the
actions (i.e. all Q-values change in the same direction). This is
understandable in an RL setting, as changing a certain feature
(e.g. victim’s health has the highest gradient value in Figure 4)
may impact the final team reward regardless of the action.
We address this issue by perturbing two features at the same
time, by modifying Algorithm 3 proposed in [16]. Formally,
in d-JSMA, the attacker wants to perturb two input features
simultaneously to increase the output Q-value of the target
action Qt and decrease the output Q-values of the non-target
actions, until the argmax(Q) selects the target action. We
can accomplish this by perturbing the input features using
the following saliency map S(X, t) and perturbation direction
dperturbation(X, t)
S(X, t)[i, j] =
0 if (∂Qt(X)∂Xi +
∂Qt(X)
∂Xj
)[
∑
k 6=t
(∂Qk(X)∂Xi +
∂Qk(X)
∂Xj
)] > 0
−(∂Qt(X)∂Xi +
∂Qt(X)
∂Xj
)[
∑
k 6=t
(∂Qk(X)∂Xi +
∂Qk(X)
∂Xj
)] otherwise
(4)
dperturbation(X, t)[i, j] = Sign(
∂Qt(X)
∂Xi
+
∂Qt(X)
∂Xj
) (5)
where X is the victim agent’s observation, i, j are the
indices of the input features. The condition in the first line
of Equation 4 filters out feature pairs whose perturbation
leads to Q-value changes in the same direction for both target
and non-target actions. If a pair of features with indices i, j
passes this filter, then its perturbation direction is determined
by dperturbation. To find an adversarial example, our method
iteratively finds a pair of input features that has the highest
saliency score and following:
Xadv,0 =X
Xadv,titer [i] =Xadv,titer−1[i] + dperturbation × θ
Xadv,titer [j] =Xadv,titer−1[j] + dperturbation × θ
(6)
where the θ is the step size of the perturbation, and titer is the
number of iterations. For each time step in a c-MARL game,
this method is invoked iteratively until a successful adversarial
example is found or the titer reaches max iteration.
The method finds a saliency score for each pair of feature
gradients and creates a bigger saliency map. By considering
two feature gradients at the same time, we obtain more
accurate estimations for the output Q-value contour of the
model, which further helps us find better options to explore
the output space. This method differs from the original JSMA
implementation in that it considers both the positive target
action Q-value gradient, as well as the negative ones (in which
case the dperturbation is negative). We refer to this method as
JSMA, using the notation d-JSMA to denote dynamic θ, and
JSMA for a fixed θ. To further improve the efficiency, more
than two feature points can be considered at the same time,
Fig. 4: Heat map of the gradient of action Q-values with respect to the input
features. The x-axis denotes the available actions ai, in this case 0 ≤ i ≤ 4;
y-axis denotes the observation features, oi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 96
however, the calculation complexity is O(nd) (d is the number
of features).
2. Dynamic θ: JSMA has a hyperparameter θ which
controls the perturbation size for each attack iteration. In our
problem setup, we found that a fixed θ does not perform
well, and a large θ does not always outperform a small θ.
One hypothesis for this behavior is due to the fast-changing
gradient in the output contour surface. To achieve better attack
performance, we propose using dynamic θ in the d-JSMA
method. For each time step in the c-MARL game, we start
with a low θ value for our attack, and if the attack is not
successful, we increase the size of θ and retry the attack until
we reach the maximum θ value.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup:
We evaluate our attacks on the StarCraft Multi-Agent Chal-
lenge (SMAC) [7]. StarCraft II is a real-time strategy game
used widely as a benchmark for RL research. We used the
”2s3z” SMAC map (2 ”Stalkers”, 3 ”Zealots” per team) for our
scenarios. Our ally team is a c-MARL system whose goal is to
defeat the opponents. For our attack, one of the ally Stalkers
is the victim, and the rest of the allies use their original policy,
trained in a centralized manner to achieve high team win rate.
More details on the features and actions can be found in [7].
B. Results and Discussion:
1) Learning adversarial policy: To learn an adversarial
policy for the victim agent, we applied the methods from III-A.
We trained an adversarial policy for the victim to select sub-
optimal actions that minimize the total reward. To evaluate the
performance of the policy, we directly control the action of the
victim based on the output of our adversarial policy. We ran
each attack method for 500 games and presented the results
in table I. From the results, OW and OWR have the highest
negative impact on team reward and win rate, with 100% loss
rate, making these two methods the most efficient.
2) d-JSMA methods: We evaluate d-JSMA with fixed attack
step size θ (0.1 - 0.9), and a dynamic one. We run 100 games
for each configuration and report their average results. For the
target action, we combine d-JSMA with LW, OW and OWR.
TABLE I: Learning adversarial policies to select the victim’s target action.
Average Reward Team Win Rate
Baseline 20.00 99.80%
Random 11.10 3.40%
QMIX Worst 10.58 1.41%
Local Worst 10.52 1.00%
Optimized Worst (OW) 9.39 0%
Optimized Worst with Reg (OWR) 9.35 0%
(a) JSMA-based Methods Target Action Success Rate
(b) JSMA-based Methods Total Reward
Fig. 5: JSMA-based Methods Evaluation under Different θ
Figure 5 shows the total reward, and target action success
rate for d-JSMA and JSMA with different θ values. Table II
shows the team win rate for both methods. The results show
that as we increase the input perturbation attack budget, the
total team reward goes down as expected. At a low budget,
JSMA+LW has relatively better attack performance. If a higher
budget is available, then d-JSMA+OWR is able to achieve
the lowest reward. Moreover, d-JSMA+OWR achieves better
performance than JSMA+LW, even if the target action success
rate is slightly lower, hence showing that the underlying OWR
action selection method is more efficient. In this experiment,
all the features are assumed to be continuous. Considering
some of the features in the SMAC benchmark are discrete in
nature, we have also conducted experiments by only perturb-
ing the continuous features, and we did not notice a major
performance difference.
3) Overall performance & budget comparison of all meth-
ods: We evaluate the overall performance of the two-step
attack methods that combine the learning adversarial policy
methods and the adversarial example generation methods.
Table III shows the best attack performance for each method
and the total team reward reduction achieved. Based on the
results, d-JSMA+OWR achieves the best attack performance.
It achieves 10.62 reward reduction, which is close to the one
achieved by directly controlling the victim with OWR (10.65).
Moreover, d-JSMA+OWR outperforms d-JSMA+OW, so we
conclude that adding regularization to OW as described in III,
does provide a benefit when combining the two attack steps.
In table III, we also show the evaluation for the perturbation
TABLE II: Team Win Rate of JSMA-based Methods.
θ LW OW OWR
0.1 2.0% 83.0% 81.0%
JSMA 0.5 0.0% 1.0% 1.0%
0.9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
d-JSMA dynamic 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TABLE III: Average perturbation required (in terms of L1 norm) v.s. total
reward reduction for JSMA and d-JSMA methods.
Total Reward Average L1 Norm
Reduction Perturbation
d-JSMA+OWR 10.62 8.33
d-JSMA+OW 10.54 9.01
JSMA+LW (θ = 0.9) 9.78 6.34
JSMA+OW (θ = 0.9) 10.42 9.62
JSMA+OWR (θ = 0.9) 10.43 9.80
it-FGSM+LW 8.36 20.37
budget. d-JSMA+OWR requires a lower budget than most
other JSMA methods, while achieving the best total reward
reduction. Figure 6 shows the perturbation distribution, where
the d-JSMA+OWR method has the highest peak densities
close to 0, showing that our regularization method effectively
reduces the required perturbation. d-JSMA+OWR also has a
lower density than d-JSMA+OW after 5 L1 norm, confirming
regularization’s effectiveness. Finally, d-JSMA-based methods
generally have higher density in the lower perturbation range
compared to JSMA methods, thus can achieve good perfor-
mance with a relatively low budget.
C. Attack Strategy in StarCraft benchmark environment
In this section, we examine the learned attack strategy
and behaviors. Using LW or QMIX worst action selection
policy (Figure 7a) results in the victim walking away from
the opponent’s range of sight—staying hidden, even after its
team is defeated. The episode ends with the victim alive.
1) Agent behaviour under OW and OWR adversarial poli-
cies: At the beginning of an episode, the victim moves away
from its team immediately, hiding until its team is almost
defeated (as in 7a). Then, it moves towards the opponents
to be defeated, as in 7b. Once within their sight range, most
often it backs away, resulting in it being defeated. We have
even observed the victim luring some of its team at times.
2) Two-step attack - d-JSMA+OWR: By only perturbing the
victim’s observation, our two-step attack can lure the victim
to behave similarly as being directly controlled by the OWR
policy. We can see the victim occasionally select sub-optimal
actions, but the attack method is able to quickly recover.
V. DISCUSSION ON DEFENSE
To improve robustness of c-MARL systems, adversarial
manipulations of both team agents and the environment need
to be taken into account during training. Being able to iso-
late the impact of malicious agents is crucial in achieving
robustness. One possible defense mechanism is to have each
agent estimate action values or reward function for other
(a) Perturbation distribution from 0 to 20 (b) Perturbation distribution from 0 to 70
Fig. 6: Distribution of required perturbations for different attack methods.
(a) QMIX worst, local worst adversarial
policy.
(b) OW, OWR adversarial policy and
combined two-step attack (d-JSMA +
OWR)
Fig. 7: Screenshots from replayed episodes. Victim agent shown in rectangle.
agents, and use the estimate to potentially identify malicious
agents. Techniques from Inverse Reinforcement Learning and
model-based RL can be applied here. Another possible defense
method involves formulating all agents as potential adversaries
during the MARL centralized training, so that an agent can
react better to adversarial actions during execution.
VI. RELATED WORK
Prior work has demonstrated that RL is vulnerable to
input perturbation attacks, where the attacker modifies the
agents observation with the goal of degrading its performance;
for example, using the FGSM [13] to attack three RL net-
works [5]. Other attacks reduce the number of adversarial
examples needed to decrease the agent’s reward [17] or trigger
misbehavior of the agent after a delay [18]. The learning
process of DQN itself can be attacked [19], by constructing
a replica model of the victim and transferring adversarial
examples from the FGSM and JSMA [16] techniques to craft
adversarial examples. None of this work studies c-MARL, and
the effects of cooperation.
The closest work to ours is perhaps Gleave et al. [6]. They
focus on attacks in the competitive multi-agent setting whereas
we instead consider cooperative teams of agents. Furthermore,
they assume full control over one of the agents (i.e., they were
able to directly control the agent’s actions), whereas we only
perturb the agent’s environment.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the first robustness analysis of cooperative
teams of RL agents. Using the StarCraft II multi-agent envi-
ronment as a benchmark, we proposed a two-step attack that
combines 1) learning an adversarial policy and 2) gradient-
based adversarial example generation. We demonstrated the
possibility of controlling the total team reward by attacking a
single agent. We hope our attack method can serve as a tool
to assist evaluating and validating the robustness of c-MARL.
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